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ABSTRACT 
Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA’s Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. The flight test was 
conducted on the Eastern Range with a launch from Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 
39 Pad B. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force 45th Space Wing required a series of Range 
Safety data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to 
granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. Range Safety data products were required to 
ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources were provided 
with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations 
adhered to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space 
Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, flight envelopes, stage 
impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential 
vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), potential debris, and debris impact 
footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation’s 
Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working 
Group. A multi-center NASA team and the 45th Space Wing collaborated within the Trajectory 
Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, perform the analyses 
necessary to generate the data products, and perform independent verification and validation of 
the data products. This paper outlines the Ares I-X Range Safety analysis requirements, provides 
an overview of the analyses, and summarizes the results of the analyses. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ares I-X was a full scale flight test of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to 
transport crew to low Earth orbit. The Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle (FTV) was geometrically similar 
to Ares I but used different propulsion because the development of the Ares I propulsion 
elements was not completed at the time of the test flight. Ares I was designed as a two stage to 
orbit vehicle that utilized a five-segment reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) First Stage (FS) 
derived from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) four-segment RSRM and a liquid propellant 
Upper Stage (US) with a J2-X engine derived from the J2 engine flown on the Saturn V. The Ares 
I-X FS used an existing SSP four-segment RSRM with an inert fifth segment to maintain 
geometric similarity with the Ares I five-segment FS. The Ares I-X US had no primary stage 
propulsion and was considered an Upper Stage Simulator (USS). The FTV is shown in Figure 1. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110011136 2019-08-30T15:30:54+00:00Z
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Figure 1 Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle 
 
The long, slender Ares I geometry with its center-of-gravity well aft of its center-of-
pressure presented aerodynamic instability and structural modal response issues that required 
the development of a robust flight control system to maintain stable flight. As a result, the primary 
objective of the test flight was to demonstrate controllability of the Ares I design during its boost 
phase. The Ares I-X trajectory was developed to provide aerodynamic loads similar to those of 
Ares I by matching the Ares I Mach number-dynamic pressure (Mach-Qbar) relationship to the 
extent possible with the lower impulse four-segment RSRM. The FTV trajectory launch azimuth 
and pitch attitude steering commands were designed such that it flew in the Ares I Exploration 
Mission flight plane and matched its Mach-Qbar relationship to within 40 psf through Mach 4.  
Matching the Ares I Mach-Qbar relationship also provided a match of the Ares I altitude versus 
Mach number relationship. The FTV trajectory development is discussed in detail in Reference 1. 
The four-segment RSRM did not have sufficient impulse to produce an Ares I similar Mach-Qbar 
relationship beyond Mach 4. The RSRM reached burnout near Mach 4.6 and separation occurred 
at approximately 129 kft, well below the Ares I Mach 6.1, 184 kft separation point. After 
separation, both the FS and USS descended uncontrolled. The FS was equipped with a recovery 
system that began a parachute deployment sequence at approximately 15,000 ft altitude to limit 
splashdown velocity. The USS descended uncontrolled until water impact and was not recovered. 
A plot of the trajectory is shown in Figure 2. A summary of the trajectory events is given in Table 
1. The values in the table are based on the FTV’s best estimated trajectory (BET) developed from 
fight data. The USS reentry BET stopped at 262 s (28.5 kft) due to the loss of radar tracking data.  
The USS impact values in Table 1 are based on propagating the USS BET to water impact using 
the USS reentry simulation. 
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Figure 2 Ares I-X Nominal Trajectory 
 
Table 1 Summary of Ares I-X Test Flight Trajectory Events 
Event  Time (s) Down Range (nmi) Altitude (kft) Q-bar (psf) 
Ascent max Q-bar 58 3.8 38.9 874 
Separation 123 36.4 128.6 102 
USS apogee 159 63.9 148.9 37 
FS apogee 160 63.9 149.1 35 
USS reentry max Q-bar 249 122.6 42.7 2355 
FS reentry max Q-bar 254 119.1 51.8 1060 
USS water impact 310 130.8 0 503 
FS water impact 352 122.1 0 13 
 
The test flight was launched from Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39, Pad B 
and flew on the Eastern Range. Because the test flight was conducted on the Eastern Range, the 
Ares I-X Test Program was required to obtain flight plan approval from the United States Air 
Force’s 45th Space Wing (45SW) and was subject to flight safety requirements documented in the 
Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710, Volume 2, Reference 2 . A preliminary 
flight data package and a final flight data package (FFDP) were delivered to the 45SW because 
the flight plan approval effort involved two phases: preliminary flight plan approval and final flight 
plan approval.  Range Safety (RS) analyses were conducted to meet the 91-710 flight safety 
requirements and the data products from those analyses were submitted to the 45SW in the flight 
data packages in support of the request for flight plan approval. The 45SW used the data 
packages to determine the risk of casualty to the public posed by the flight, to develop flight 
displays for monitoring the FTV during its powered flight, and to develop flight rules regarding 
what action to take in the event of an anomaly.  
This paper provides an overview of the Ares I-X RS flight analyses conducted to obtain 
flight approval and presents a subset of the analysis results. 
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RANGE SAFETY ANALYSES OVERVIEW 
The AFSPCMAN 91-710, Volume 2 is a general document that defines the range safety 
flight analyses requirements for all vehicles that fly on the Eastern Range. The 45SW worked with 
the Ares I-X Test Program to tailor the requirements to the Ares I-X test flight. The FTV was 
considered a space vehicle, and as such, the 91-710 was tailored to reflect the space vehicle 
requirements. The tailored requirements are documented in Reference 3.  The tailored 91-710 
flight safety requirements consisted of the analyses listed below. Each analysis is discussed in 
more detail in later sections. 
1. Trajectory analysis 
2. Malfunction turn analysis 
3. Debris analysis 
4. Buoyancy analysis 
5. Acoustic analysis 
6. Sonic boom analysis 
7. Post flight performance analysis. 
All RS analyses were conducted in accordance with, and with the cooperation of, the 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group 
(RSTWG). Regular meetings were held in which the Ares I-X System Engineering and Integration 
(SE&I) trajectory team worked in conjunction with the RSTWG members and 45SW to develop all 
Range Safety analysis methodologies and data products. RSTWG team members from Johnson 
Space Center (JSC) had experience developing SSP Range Safety products. Their experience 
was combined with the SE&I trajectory team’s knowledge of the FTV to develop the best method 
for producing Ares I-X specific data products that incorporated lessons learned throughout the 
Shuttle program. The RSTWG consisted of personnel from the following NASA centers and 
support contractors: 
 Ares I-X SE&I trajectory team at Langley Research Center (LaRC)  
 Range Safety and Probabilistic Risk Assessment teams  at JSC  
 United Space Alliance (USA) at JSC 
 Willbrook Solutions at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
 Jacobs Engineering at MSFC 
 Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
 Aerospace Corporation in Los Angeles 
 45SW 
 
The RS data products were developed using a verification and validation approach to 
ensure the proper data products were developed and that the data products delivered were 
accurate to the greatest extent possible and free of errors.  Due to the critical safety aspect 
involved with protecting the public, it was imperative that the RS products be correct and timely. 
Consequences of incorrect data included a launch delay, risk to people/facilities on the ground, 
and unintended flight termination. A complete description of the IV&V process is documented in 
Reference 4. 
Range Safety data products were validated by the 45SW. Regular RSTWG meetings 
were held with the 45SW in attendance to provide a forum for identifying all requirements 
applicable to the FTV and for developing appropriate methods to generate and verify the data 
products. The 45SW provided guidance in properly understanding and interpreting the Range 
Safety requirements and validated that the method used to generate the products was acceptable 
and that the data products generated met their requirements. 
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The RS data products developed from flight simulations were verified by independent 
analyses while non-flight simulation data products were verified through organizational reviews. 
The independent flight simulation analyses were conducted by teams located at the NASA 
centers listed in Table 2. The verification process consisted of two phases, simulation verification 
and results verification. The simulation verification process verified that the correct FTV models 
and environmental inputs were used and that they were implemented in the simulation correctly.  
It did not seek to verify the correctness or accuracy of FTV specific simulation models. The FTV 
simulation models were properly validated and verified by their discipline’s Constellation Program 
review panelprior to being incorporated into the flight simulations. The results verification process 
verified that all simulation runs required to generate the data products had been completed and 
that the data products were error free. Both simulation and results verification was achieved by 
demonstrating agreement between the primary and verification data product to within tolerances 
established in the RSTWG. The verification approach assumed that if a model implementation 
error occurred or if an error occurred in the results generation, it did not manifest itself in the 
same manner in both simulations and was identifiable through comparison of simulation results. 
 
Table 2 Roles and Responsibilities for Range Safety Analyses 
Product Primary Source Verification Source 
Trajectory Analysis: Nominal Ascent Trajectories LaRC JSC and MSFC 
Trajectory Analysis: Nominal Impact Points LaRC Aerospace Corp. 
Trajectory Analysis: Flight Envelopes LaRC MSFC 
Trajectory Analysis: Stage Disposal Footprints LaRC Aerospace Corp. 
Malfunction Turn Analysis LaRC JSC 
Debris Analysis  LaRC NESC review 
Acoustic Analysis LaRC LaRC review 
Sonic Boom Analysis LaRC LaRC review 
Buoyancy Analysis JPL LaRC review 
 
TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS 
The trajectory analysis consisted of defining the FTV nominal trajectory, its flight 
envelopes, and the impact footprints of all bodies jettisoned during the flight. The trajectory 
analyses were performed for a launch season from July 1, 2009 until November 30, 2009 using a 
six-degree-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulation developed in the Program to Optimize Simulation 
Trajectories II, Reference 5, that included the FTV’s guidance, navigation, and control systems. 
The nominal and flight envelope trajectory analyses are documented in Reference 6. The impact 
footprint analyses are documented in References 7 and 8. 
Nominal trajectories were developed for each month in the launch season using monthly 
mean atmosphere, monthly mean winds, and nominal (undispersed) FTV system parameters. An 
evaluation of the monthly trajectories was made to determine if a single month was representative 
of the entire season. Comparison of the monthly nominal trajectories steepness and cross-range 
as functions of time, down-range position, and velocity indicated that a September nominal 
trajectory was representative of the entire launch season and sufficient for use in developing 
Range Safety flight displays. The September nominal trajectory sequence of events and time 
histories of position, velocity, acceleration, attitude, and attitude rate were delivered to the 45SW. 
The flight envelope analysis defines the limits of a normally operating vehicle in the 
Range Safety horizontal and vertical planes. A total of six flight envelopes are required to define 
the limits of normal operation, four horizontal plane envelopes and two vertical plane envelopes. 
The horizontal plane is a plan view of the trajectory in which the down-range position and latitude 
of the FTV’s instantaneous vacuum impact point (IIP) is monitored. The four horizontal plane 
three-sigma envelopes consist of the maximum instantaneous impact point (MaxIIP), minimum 
instantaneous impact point (MinIIP), left instantaneous impact point (LIIP), and right 
6 
 
instantaneous impact point (RIIP) envelopes. The MaxIIP and MinIIP envelopes define the 
maximum and minimum IIP down range position of a normally operating FTV as a function time.  
The LIIP and RIIP envelopes define the maximum left and right IIP latitude of a normally 
operating FTV as a function of longitude.  Figure 3 shows an illustration of the horizontal plane 
with notional LIIP and RIIP envelopes and an example of the MaxIIP and MinIIP at a single point 
in time early in flight. 
 
Figure 3 Range Safety Horizontal Plane with LIIP and RIIP Envelopes 
 
The vertical planes, shown in Figure 4, are side views of the trajectory in which the 
steepness of an ascent is monitored relative to impact limit lines (ILLs). The FTV vertical planes 
were defined from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) North and South ILL’s by creating a non 
orthogonal coordinate system with its origin at the launch pad, the X axis normal to the SSP North 
ILL, the Y axis normal to the SSP South ILL, and Z axis formed by right hand rule. The coordinate 
system’s XZ plane is referred to as the Launch Area Steep (LAS) plane and its YZ plane is 
referred to as the Launch Area Lateral (LAL) plane. The FTV trajectory was projected into the 
LAS and LAL planes to define its position in each plane. The LAS and LAL envelopes defined the 
maximum altitude for a normally operating FTV as a function of its down-range position in each 
plane. .  
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Figure 4 Range Safety Vertical Planes with LAS and LAL Trajectories 
 
Monte Carlo analyses were performed that dispersed the FTV system parameters and 
each month’s environmental parameters to define the 3-sigma dispersion in the direction of each 
envelope. The Monte Carlo analyses were required by the 45SW to use 3-sigma wind 
magnitudes applied in the worst case directions rather than randomly dispersed wind magnitudes 
and directions. Performing a Monte Carlo analysis for each month and worst case wind direction 
would have required 30 analyses. To reduce the number of analyses, Monte Carlo analyses were 
only performed for the months and wind directions that produced the largest or smallest (most 
extreme) LAS, LAL, LIIP, RIIP, MaxIIP, and MinIIP values throughout the entire ascent of a 
nominal FTV. This was possible because the Monte Carlo dispersions were normally distributed 
about the nominal FTV system parameter trajectory. For example, a FTV with nominal system 
parameters had the highest Z position in the LAS and LAL planes throughout the ascent during 
August with the August 3-sigma wind blowing from the East, i.e. a head wind; thus only a Monte 
Carlo analysis with August environmental parameters and 3-sigma head wind was required to 
define the LAL and LAS 3-sigma dispersion. Similarly, during November, the nominal FTV had 
the largest RIIP and LIIP values throughout the entire ascent with 3-sigma winds blowing from the 
North and South. A single month in the launch season did not result in the largest MaxIIP and 
smallest MinIIP values throughout the entire ascent. As a result, Monte Carlo analyses were 
performed for each month that had the largest/smallest MaxIIP and MinIIP at some point during 
the ascent.  
Six flight envelopes were developed that encompassed the LAS, LAL, RIIP, LIIP, MaxIIP, 
and MinIIP 3-sigma dispersions of each month in the launch season. Each flight envelope was an 
individual trajectory of the FTV with its system parameters and environmental parameters 
adjusted such that its trajectory encompassed the dispersions in the direction of that envelope. 
The trajectories were developed for a single month and wind direction to be physically consistent 
rather than changing the environmental conditions to those of different months during the ascent. 
In the case of the MaxIIP and MinIIP envelope, a 4-sigma bound for one month had to be used in 
order to encompass the 3-sigma dispersions that occurred throughout the launch season. To be 
consistent with the MaxIIP and MinIIP approach, 4-sigma bounds were defined for the LAS, LAL, 
RIIP,and  LIIP, dispersions as well. Trajectories that encompassed each of the four-sigma bounds 
were developed by adjusting the FTV dispersions that most affected flight along a particular 
boundary.  Those six trajectories defined the six flight envelopes. Examples of the RIIP, LIIP, 
MaxIIP, and MinIIP flight envelopes are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 FTV Flight Envelopes 
 
Impact footprints define the area over which each jettisoned body can potentially impact 
the ocean. An area is provided rather than a single point in order to account for uncertainties in 
the separation state, weight, aerodynamics, and atmosphere and wind variability. The FTV 
jettisoned bodies consisted of the USS, FS, FS nose cap, and FS forward skirt extension. Their 
impact footprints were developed for each month in the launch season using Monte Carlo 
analyses of the FTV stage separation, FS reentry, and USS reentry. Individual footprints of each 
jettisoned body were developed by encompassing the 99.73 percentile of the Monte Carlo impact 
points. In addition, a composite footprint was developed that encompassed the 99.73 percentile 
of all jettisoned bodies’ Monte Carlo impact points. An example of the FS impact footprint is 
shown in Figure 6. During reentry, the FS could trim in a nose first, broadside, or tail first 
orientation. The trim classifications were based on the trim attitude at reentry maximum dynamic 
pressure with nose-first defined as trim between 0 and 40 total angle of attack, broad-side 
defined as trim between 40 and 140 total angle of attack, and tail-first defined as trim between 
140 and 180 total angle of attack.  Nose-first trim was undesirable because it adversely affected 
recovery. The impact footprints were used by the 45SW to place the FS recovery ships and to 
develop a Notice to Airmen and Mariners for the test flight. 
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Figure 6 FS Footprint Developed From Monte Carlo Impact Points 
MALFUNCTION TURN ANALYSIS 
The malfunction turn analysis defined the extent to which the FTV could turn away from 
its nominal trajectory as the result of a failure. The analysis is documented in Reference 9. 
Potential failure modes were identified by a probabilistic risk assessment performed by Johnson 
Space Center’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment Team in conjunction with failure analyses 
performed by the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel’s Trajectory Working Group. The 
failure modes and the probability of their occurrence are documented Reference 10. The analysis 
identified the following four categories of failure modes that could potentially occur at any time 
from ignition to RSRM burnout:  
1. Loss of thrust vector control 
2. RSRM nozzle burn through 
3. RSRM case breach 
4. Software failures 
The effect of a failure on the FTV trajectory was determined by modeling each failure mode in the 
6-DOF simulations and initiating the failure at times ranging from ignition to RSRM burnout in two 
second intervals. A total of 8423 malfunction turn cases were run to simulate all the potential 
failures in the categories above at two second intervals throughout the ascent. The FTV’s turn 
angle relative to its nominal trajectory was used as a means of quantifying how much a failure 
can turn the FTV trajectory.  The turn angle is defined as the three-dimensional angle between 
the nominal FTV velocity vector and the failed FTV velocity vector as shown in Figure 7. The turn 
angle was calculated in one second intervals after the time of failure initiation up to RSRM 
burnout, FTV failure, or ground impact. The maximum turn angle time that resulted from all failure 
modes and the associated FTV velocity was determined up to twelve seconds after failure 
initiation and submitted to the 45SW in a composite turn angle table. Plots of the maximum turn 
angle at two, four, six, and eight seconds after failure occurred are shown as a function of the 
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time failure started in Figure 8.  The 45SW used the turn angle information in conjunction with 
debris ballistic data to develop destruct criteria such as destruct lines. 
 
Figure 7 Turn Angle 
 
 
Figure 8 Maximum Turn Angle vs. Failure Initiation Time 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
M
ax
im
um
 tu
rn
 a
ng
le
, d
eg
re
es
Failure initiation time, seconds
2 sec after failure initiation
4 sec after failure initiation
8 sec after failure initiation
11 
 
DEBRIS ANALYSIS 
Debris analysis determines the debris that can arise from vehicle breakup as a result of a 
malfunction turn, uncontrolled tumble, or activation of the flight termination system (FTS) and 
characterizes the debris’ geometry, weight, aerodynamic drag and lift coefficients, and ballistic 
coefficient. The Ares I-X debris analysis is documented in Reference 11. The Ares I-X analysis 
determined the potential debris from breakup of the USS and from FS components not 
associated with the propellant segments and aft skirt of the SSP RSRM. Debris characteristics of 
the propellant segments and aft skirt were obtained from SSP debris data. The USS primary 
structure, shown in Figure 9, consisted of 13 segments bolted together at flange joints. The FS 
components not associated with the propellant segments consisted of the frustum, forward skirt 
extension, forward skirt, and inert fifth segment. The joints between those FS segments were also 
bolted joints. The FS structural segments are shown in Figure 10. Joint tests indicated that tensile 
failure (required for the segments to break apart) would occur at the segment joints prior to the 
outer wall material rupturing. As a result, the debris analysis assumed breakup to occur only at 
the joints. Once the primary structure failed, there was a potential for internal structures to break 
free. The internal structures of significance consisted of walkway platforms and ballast assembly 
components. As with the primary structure, joint failure was assumed to be the failure mode that 
resulted in those components breaking free.  
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Figure 9 Segments of USS primary structure 
 
 
Figure 10 FS structural segments 
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The FTV stack was analyzed for potential breakup due to each malfunction turn scenario 
and to FTS activation. The USS was analyzed for breakup during reentry. There was a potential 
for USS breakup during reentry because it was not designed to be recovered. Instead, its 
structure was designed to only withstand loads during the controlled ascent phase of flight. The 
FS was not analyzed for breakup during reentry because it was designed to withstand reentry 
loads and be recovered. 
The FTV malfunction turn and USS reentry breakups were determined by embedding a 
structural model within the malfunction turn and USS reentry simulations that calculated axial and 
shear running loads at each joint for the flight conditions and compared those values to the joint’s 
structural load limit. Once a load limit was reached at any joint, breakup was assumed to occur at 
that joint resulting in two debris configurations. In the USS breakup analysis, the process was 
repeated by propagating the trajectories of the resulting debris configurations until they broke up 
or water impact occurred. The malfunction turn breakup analysis stopped at the first joint failure 
and recorded the trajectory state. The debris configurations that resulted during the USS reentry 
were assumed to be possible after a malfunction turn. The 45SW developed debris impact 
footprints resulting from the malfunction turn scenarios by initializing the USS debris 
configurations with the states provided and propagating their reentry trajectory to ground/water 
impact. 
The geometry, weight, aerodynamic, and ballistic characteristics of the potential debris 
configurations determined from the breakup analyses were summarized in a debris catalog. The 
aerodynamic coefficients and ballistic coefficients were determined as a function of Mach 
number. In the hypersonic regime, the aerodynamic coefficients were obtained from aerodynamic 
databases developed for the breakup analyses. In the supersonic and subsonic regimes, average 
tumbling drag coefficients were approximated using data from Reference 12 and average 
tumbling lift coefficients were approximated using data from Reference 13. The ballistic coefficient 
versus Mach number relationships for all the potential debris configurations identified in the 
breakup analysis is plotted in Figure 11. From the figure, it can be seen that the ballistic 
coefficients range from 35 lb/ft2 to 900 lb/ft2 in the supersonic flight regime and from 35 lb/ft2 to 
1250 lb/ft2 in the subsonic flight regime. 
 
Figure 11 Ballistic Coefficient vs. Mach Number Relations of All Possible Debris 
Configurations 
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BUOYANCY ANALYSIS 
Buoyancy analysis determines the potential for any jettisoned body or debris to float after 
water impact. If a jettisoned body or piece of debris has the potential to float, a means of 
recovering or sinking it must be developed. The bodies jettisoned during the test flight consisted 
of the FS nose cap, forward skirt extension, and parachutes. They were the same as those for 
SSP flights and required no analysis to show that they did not have sufficient buoyancy to float. 
The debris configurations identified in the debris analysis were analyzed for buoyancy. The debris 
consisted of steel plates, FS and USS segments open at both ends, and USS segments closed at 
one end by the Crew Module/Launch Abort System (CM/LAS) simulators.  The segments closed 
off by the CM/LAS simulator had the potential to trap air inside them and float when they 
impacted the water open end first. Fourteen such debris configurations were identified in the 
debris analysis. As a result, arrangements were made for a United States Coast Guard vessel to 
locate and sink that debris. 
. 
ACOUSTIC ANALYSIS 
The acoustic analysis defines far field sound pressure levels and the acoustic spectra 
around the launch site. The Ares I-X test flight acoustic analysis is documented in Reference 14. 
The sound pressure levels generated by the test flight were a function of the FTV’s acoustic 
energy, the directivity of noise propagation, and atmospheric attenuation. The FTV’s acoustic 
energy was calculated to be 203 db using the methods documented in Reference 15 and the SSP 
four-segment RSRM thrust characteristics. The FTV was represented as a compact source with a 
directivity angle of approximately 155. The acoustic energy was propagated using the 
Atmospheric Noise Propagation Program, Reference 15, taking into account the effects of 
spherical spreading, characteristic impendence, and atmospheric absorption. The sound pressure 
levels generated by the FTV are shown in Figure 12.  The low frequency content of the acoustic 
energy traveled with very little attenuation and decreased primarily due to spherical spreading. As 
a result, sound pressure levels above 85 db extended to the Orlando area. The propagation of 
low frequency noise could not be accurately predicted at distances beyond Orlando. 
The acoustic energy spectra were calculated at down-range and up-range points from 0.5 
nmi to 4.0 nmi in increments of 0.5 nmi at the time the overall sound pressure level was a 
maximum at that point. The acoustic spectra were documented in data tables and delivered to the 
45SW. 
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Figure 12 FTV Sound Pressure Contours 
 
SONIC BOOM ANALYSIS 
Sonic boom analysis determines the location and intensity of the sonic boom ground 
signature. The Ares I-X test flight sonic boom analysis is also documented Reference 14. The 
FTV’s near field pressure signature (NFS) was used in conjunction with its trajectory to determine 
the location of the sonic boom ground signature. The FTV’s NFS was determined from 
computational fluid dynamics data sets at a distance of 3.5 diameters from the vehicle centerline. 
The Mach 3.5 data set is shown in Figure 13. The solid black line in Figure 13 indicates the cross 
sections where the NFS was calculated. The sonic boom ground signature closest to shore 
occurred at a distance of 26.8 nmi down-range of the launch site. The intensity of the ground 
signature was not reported because exhaust plume data, which has a significant effect on the 
intensity, was not available at the time of the analysis.  This was acceptable to the 45SW 
because the location of the ground signature was more than 12 nmi off the coast. U.S. Air Force 
Airspace Management AFI 13-201 requires a permit to be obtained for sonic booms occurring 
less than 12 nmi off shore. 
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Figure 13 Example of CFD Dataset Used to Calculate NFS 
 
POST FLIGHT ANALYSIS 
Post flight analysis provides the 45SW with an assessment of the flight. The Ares I-X post 
flight analysis is documented in Reference 17. The Ares I-X post flight analysis required the 
following information: 
 Qualitative statement of FS performance. 
 Performance of on-board safety instrumentation 
 Description of any failures that occurred and the resulting flight condition. 
 Probable cause of failure and corrective action. 
 Comparison of planned and achieved FS cutoff conditions. 
 Estimated impact points of FS and USS. 
The FS motor, its thrust vector control system, primary stage separation system, and range safety 
system, including on-board safety instrumentation, performed within preflight predictions.  The 
recovery system performed normally up to the main parachute deployment. However, at main 
parachute deployment, one of the three parachutes failed. The failure was due to the parachute 
being disreefed prior to deployment. The design of the pyrotechnic reefing line cutter is being 
reviewed to correct the problem. 
A best estimate of the FTV’s trajectory was constructed from available flight data and 
used to make post flight comparisons. The BET consisted of the FTV ascent up to separation, FS 
reentry to water impact, and the USS reentry down to approximately 28.5 kft. The USS reentry 
BET ended at 28.5 kft due to the loss of radar tracking data at that point which was the only data 
source available for the USS reentry reconstruction. Below 28.5 kft, the USS reentry was 
approximated using the USS reentry simulation initialized with the USS BET state at 28.5 kft. The 
trajectory reconstruction process used to develop the BETs is documented in Reference 18. The 
planned FS cutoff conditions were within 2.0% or less of the BET values. The BET FS and USS 
impact points were within the predicted footprints. A comparison of the estimated and preflight 
stage impact points is shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14 Post Flight vs. Preflight Predicted Stage Impact Points 
 
The FTV ascent trajectory predicted by the flight simulation when updated with day of 
launch (DOL) data was compared to the BET as a means of assessing how accurately the 
simulation could predict the actual flight. The FFDP simulation results were expected to differ 
from the actual flight because it used monthly mean winds and RSRM propellant mean bulk 
temperature (PMBT). DOL wind measurements and PMBT prediction allowed the simulation to be 
updated with DOL values to improve its accuracy. The updated simulation is referred to as the 
post-flight simulation.  Figure 15 through 17 are examples of some of the post flight 
simulation/BET comparisons. With DOL updates, the post flight simulation matched the BET to 
within the tolerances established in the IV&V process to verify simulation outputs. 
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Figure 15 BET/Post Flight Simulation Altitude Comparison 
 
 
Figure 16 BET/Post Flight Simulation Velocity Comparison 
 
 
Figure 17 BET/Post Flight Simulation Angle of Attack Comparison 
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The BET was compared to the FFDP flight envelopes to document that the flight occurred 
within the envelopes. Examples of the flight envelope comparisons are shown in Figure 18 and 
19. The plot on the left shows the comparison to the BET while the plot on the right shows the 
difference between the flight envelope and the BET. The differences are a measure of the margin 
between the actual flight and the flight envelope. The BET indicated the flight was near nominal 
and was well within all flight envelopes. Note that in Figure 19 the BET and Post-Flight Sim 
values are nearly the same so that the BET cyan curve overlays the Post-Flight Sim red curve. 
 
Figure 18 BET Comparison to LIIP and RIIP Envelopes 
 
 
Figure 19 BET Comparison to MaxIIP and MinIIP Envelopes 
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ACRONYMS 
45SW 45th Space Wing 
6DOF 6 Degrees-of-Freedom 
AFSPCMAN Air Force Space Command Manual 
BET Best Estimated Trajectory 
CM/LAS Crew Module and Launch Abort System 
DOL Day of Launch 
FFDP Final Flight Data Package 
FS First Stage 
FTS Flight Termination System 
FTV Flight Test Vehicle 
IIP Instantaneous Impact Point 
ILL Impact Limit Line 
IV&V Independent Verification and Validation 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LAL Launch Area Lateral 
LAS Launch Area Steep 
LIIP Left Instantaneous Impact Point 
MaxIIP Maximum Instantaneous Impact Point 
MinIIP Minimum Instantaneous Impact Point 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NFS Near Field Signature 
PMBT Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature 
RIIP Right Instantaneous Impact Point 
RS Range Safety 
RSRM Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 
RSTWG Range Safety Trajectory Working Group 
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
US Upper Stage 
USA United Space Alliance 
USS Upper Stage Simulator 
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